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Abstract 
Distributed decision makers are modeled as 
players in a game with two levels. High level 
decisions concern the game environment and 
determine the willingness of the players to 
form a coalition (or group). Low level deci­
sions involve the actions to be implemented 
within the chosen environment. Coalition 
and action strategies are determined by pro b­
ability distributions which are updated using 
learning automata schemes. The payoffs are 
also probabilistic and there is uncertainty in 
the state vector since information is delayed. 
The goal is to reach equilibrium in both lev­
els of decision making; the results show the 
conditions for instability, based on the age of 
information. 
1 Introduction 
Agents in a distributed system make decisions to opti­
mize a performance metric or achieve a more abstract 
set of goals. These agents must typically consider 
working with other agents to cooperatively achieve 
the desired result. However, there is a high degree 
of uncertainty in these activities. First, the agent may 
not know the true state of the system as a result of 
delayed information. The delays may be due to in­
herent latencies in a network or the intermittent (or 
periodic) exchange of information. The agents make 
the best possible decisions with the information avail­
able [Gmyt:rasiewicz et al., 199lcj. Second, even with 
instantaneous information, there is uncertainty in the 
strategies employed by the other agents given the state 
vector. For example, an agent may not be certain that 
another agent is willing to cooperate or to what ex­
tent. Third, even with knowledge of the other strate­
gies, there is uncertainty in the payoffs that result from 
the combined actions. 
We present a model to capture the nature of these var­
ious uncertainties with distributed decision makers as 
players in a game with two levels. The high level con-
cerns the game environment and determines the will­
ingness of the players to form a coalition (or group). 
The low level involves the actions to be implemented 
within the chosen environment. 
Both of these strategies are modeled using probabil­
ity distributions with updates according to learning 
automata schemes [Narendra and Thathachar, 1989]. 
This implies that learning is taking place on two levels 
and a constraint is that a player must make both deci­
sions simultaneously, without knowledge of the other 
players' decisions at either level. In particular, a player 
knows whether it is willing to form a group but does 
not know the intentions of the other players. This 
implies that a player may select an action under the 
assumption of cooperative behavior but this action, in 
the context of non-cooperative behavior, may result in 
suboptimal performance. 
The payoffs in the games are stochastic, that is, there 
is a probability of gain or loss based upon the action 
set. Uncertainty in information is captured by the as­
sumption that an average age of information exists in 
the system. The goal of the model is to capture deci­
sion making under uncertainty in various domains and 
to summarize uncertainty as probability distributions. 
The adaptive learning schemes easily model the uncer­
tainty, permit expected value computations to deter­
mine beliefs, and have analytic solutions to complex 
dynamical behaviors. These schemes may also be con­
sidered as approximations to more complex reasoning 
schemes. 
In most distributed systems an important goal is to 
achieve a stable solution. We develop a dynamical 
equation to predict the behavior based on the param­
eter settings and apply linear stability analysis to pre­
dict the onset of persistent oscillations. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes 
related work; Section 3 develops the model in stages, 
including the dynamical equation; Section 4 shows ex­
ample simulations and associated predicted behavior. 
In Section 5, we make an assumption that leads to a 
reasonably accurate prediction of the delay required 
to initiate persistent instabilities in the system. Our 
conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
Learning in Multi-Level Stochastic Games with Delayed Information 87 
2 Related Work 
Our interests in distributed decision making are closely 
related to the evolution of cooperation [Axelrod and 
Hamilton, 1981] and computational ecosystems. The 
original description of computational ecologies [Huber­
man and Hogg, 1988] shows the dynamical equation 
based on simple gain functions with imperfect and de­
layed information. A large system of agents select re­
sources based on aged information of other agents' re­
source preferences. The resultant behavior can be cat­
egorized as stable, oscillatory (both damped and per­
sistent), or chaotic (with possible bifurcations). The 
agreement between the dynamical equation and sim­
ulation is demonstrated in [Kephart et al., 1989] and 
the existence of a general adaptive strategy to elimi­
nate the instabilities is shown in [Hogg and Huberman, 
1991]. 
In distributed computing systems, a high degree of 
physical decentralization leads to aged information 
such that agents are not able to attain common 
knowledge [Halpern and Moses, 1990]. The goal of 
agents in these systems is to make good decisions 
with the information available and, in particular, to 
make good decisions involving cooperation with other 
agents. Other research examines cooperation without 
communication [Genesereth et al., 1985] and coopera­
tion with negotiated protocols [Rosenschein and Gene­
sereth, 1985]. 
Our approach is to examine learning mechanisms 
such as learning automata [Narendra and Thathachar, 
1989] in environments with delayed information. The 
basic research relevant to automata playing stochastic 
games (and the associated dynamics) is found in !Lak­
shmivarahan and Narendra, 1982]. Our model extends 
this to delayed information and a hierarchy of games. 
The games in our model represent the payoffs of an un­
derlying application such as robotics [Gmytrasiewicz et 
al., 1991a]. 
Learning automata have demonstrated coadaptive be­
havior in a distributed queueing system [Glockner and 
Pasquale, 1993]. We have also examined learning au­
tomata in autonomous decentralized queueing systems 
[Billard and Pasquale, 1993a] and in games [Billard 
and Pasquale, 1993b]. We view the learning algo­
rithms as generic in the sense that they capture in­
cremental, or adaptive, learning. 
Although increased levels of communication can re­
duce the age of information to the minimum latency, 
there is an associated cost in processing this informa­
tion. For this reason, it is important to exchange only 
the appropriate information. This can be done based 
on expected utility [Gmytrasiewicz et al., 1991c] with 
agents reaching equilibrium using recursive reasoning 
[Gmytrasiewicz et al., 1991b]. 
3 The Model 
The model is developed in four stages: 1) the ba­
sic algorithm for a learning automaton [Narendra and 
Thathachar, 1989], 2) the algorithm applied to the 
strategies of two players in a game, 3) the algorithm 
applied again to the strategies of selecting between two 
games, and 4) the delay in state information. The 
salient feature of the model is that each agent makes 
a decision to work in a group or alone, thus affecting 
the environmental payoffs, and a decision regarding 
the action to be taken within the chosen environment. 
Step 1: One Automaton - Two Strategies 
Let p( t) and p( t) be the probability of selecting strat­
egy 1 and strategy 2, respectively, at timet. The prob­
ability is incremented or decremented for the next time 
step by 
{ +f3p 
Ap=B· -(3p -ap 
ap 
if reward on strategy 1 
if reward on strategy 2 
if penalty on strategy 1 
if penalty on strategy 2 
(1) 
The extent of the incremental change in the mixed 
strategy is determined by the three constants: (3 is the 
reward parameter, o: is the penalty parameter, and () 
is the step size parameter. It is assumed that 0 < o: < 
(3 < 1 and 0 < () :::; 1. Although (} can be incorporated 
into a and (3, it is convenient to extract this term for 
simulation and analysis results. 
Step 2: Two Players - Two Strategies 
We define two players k, l E {1, 2} in a game D = 
(D1, D2), where Dk represents a stochastic payoff ma­
trix for player k !Lakshmivarahan and Narendra, 1982; 
Narendra and Thathachar, 1989] and corresponds to 
an underlying application. Each player chooses a strat­
egy i,j E {1,2}, respectively, and the game is played 
in stages with element at of Dk being the probabil­
ity of a unit gain for player k based upon the strategy 
pair (i,j). With probability 1-d�i' player k receives a 
unit loss. This differs from games with deterministic 
payoffs as there is uncertainty in the result based upon 
the strategy pair. In the model, the game payoffs are 
the expected difference in gain and loss, gfj = 2dt -1, 
which scales to the interval l-1,+1]. The hi-matrix 
D is a nonzero-sum game such that both players may 
receive a unit gain (or unit loss), that is, d}i does not 
necessarily equal 1-drj· 
The decisions are made using randomization and, as 
such, both players are uncertain as to the pure strat­
egy that will be employed by the other player. Let 
p = (Pt, p2) be the state vector where Pk is the pro b­
ability that player k will select strategy 1 and Pk is 
the probability of strategy 2. Each player employs 
an automaton to update the probabilities for the next 
stage where a unit gain is a reward and a unit loss is 
a penalty. 
The following closely parallels the derivation in [Laksh-
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mivarahan and Narendra, 1982] except that we include 
nonzero-sum games, delayed information, and a more 
general notation that permits learning in a hierarchy 
of games. 
Let 8z(t) = z(t+1)-z(t). The expected change in the 
probability vector can be deduced from (1 ). For exam­
ple, with probability p1, player 1 will select strategy 1. 
If the player receives a reward, then p1 will increment 
by Bj3p1• Following this reasoning for all possibilities: 
where 
E[8p(t)ip(t) = p] = BW(p), 
f3PkPk[Cf(p)- c;(p)] + 
a[p�c;(p)- p�Cf(p)] 
(2) 
(3) 
and Cf (p) is the probability that player k receives a 
reward for strategy i. This is determined as follows. 
Let Pk = (Pk Pk) be the probability vector for player k. 
The expected game payoff, or value of the game, for 
player k is 
(4) 
where pf is the transpose of P2· Now, Cf(p) = 1Jk(q) 
where q = p but with the kth element replaced by 2-i. 
For example, if player 1 selects strategy 1, then the 
expected payoff is P2d�1 + fi2d�2• 
We recast the difference equation as a differential equa­
tion as this closely captures the behavior for the typical 
parameter settings, i.e. small B. Therefore, 
dp dt = BW(p). (5) 
The equilibrium solution is p* where W(p*) = 0.  
Note that the values of  the learning parameters affect 
the equilibrium solution, that is, p*=f(a,,B,D). 
Step 3: Four Players - Two Games 
We introduce the concept of multi-level games to cap­
ture the notion of cooperation in group dynamics, see 
Figure 1. An agent consists of two subcomponents, 
or players, each of which is modeled as a learning au­
tomaton. One player within each agent makes a pref­
erence decision between two game hi-matrices A, the 
non-default game matrix, and B, the default game ma­
trix. Game B represents the underlying environment 
when the agents choose not to form a group. Typi­
cally, the payoffs will be lower but easier to achieve (in 
the sense of an equilibrium). Game A represents the 
environment when both agents agree to cooperate in 
a group with the expectation that better payoffs are 
available to both agents. However, to achieve these 
payoffs, the agents must successfully coordinate their 
actions within the game, perhaps a more difficult task 
in this game than in B. This second activity, i.e. se­
lecting an action strategy within the chosen game envi­
ronment, is carried out by an additional player within 
each agent. If an agent is willing to play game A, there 
is uncertainty whether the other agent will agree and, 
hence, the player subcomponent may make poor ac­
tion decisions. For example, player 1 may select action 
strategy 1 since it has a high expectation of success in 
game A, the agent's preferred matrix. If agent 2 forces 
the default game environment, strategy 1 may yield a 
very poor result. It is the uncertainty in coalition for­
mation and the simultaneity of decision making that 
makes action decision making difficult. 
Agent 1 
Decision: strategy 1 or 2? 
.l 
-ACTION-
- GROUP-
I I I I I 
T 
Decision: game A or B? 
Agent 2 
Figure 1: Multi-Level Decision Making by Agents' 
Components 
We define the high level decisions (i.e. which game 
matrix) as group strategies and the low level decisions 
(i.e. which strategy within a game) as action strate­
gies. The formal definition of the model is as follows. 
The action strategies are determined as before (using 
P1 and P2)· The group strategies are also made using 
randomization with p3 the probability that player 3 (a 
subcomponent of agent 1) will prefer A over B (like­
wise, p4 is the probability for player 4, a subcomponent 
of agent 2 ). The state vector is now p = (Pb P2, P3, P4). 
At the high level, each player uses an automaton to de­
cide the game preference. At the low level, each player 
uses a different automaton to select a strategy. The ac­
tion pair is determined at the same time as the group 
decision. The resultant action pair (i,j) is played in 
game A if, and only if, both agents prefer this game 
matrix. That is, the agents agree to form a coalition 
with probability c = p3p4, the clustering parameter. 
Otherwise, the stochastic payoffs are determined by 
B with the agents operating in a non-coalition mode. 
The problem of apportioning credit to the different 
levels is avoided by assuming that both levels receive 
the same payoff, that is, both receive either a unit gain 
or unit loss. 
An average game is induced based on the high level 
strategies: 
(6) 
The dynamical equation is still ( 5) but where k E 
{1,2,3,4} and Dk = Dk-2 fork E {3,4}. Note that 
this equation enforces a strong interaction among the 
state variables. The low level strategies are dependent 
on the high level strategies for the expectation of the 
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A a 
game 1 game 2 game 3 
Figure 2: Example Games 
average game. They are also dependent on each other 
via the stochastic payoffs based on action pairs. The 
high level strategies are dependent on the low level 
strategies since the reward (or penalty) is derived in 
the same way. The potential exists for different learn­
ing rates at different levels but, in this study, both 
rates are identically 9. 
Step 4: Delayed Information 
Since agents are physically distributed, the informa­
tion available to an agent is delayed. The state vector 
p describes the probabilities of decisions at both the 
high and low level and, in our model, is subject to aged 
information. That is, the agents must make the best 
decisions possible given an aged view of the likelihood 
of the other agent's decisions. 
Let T be the average delay in information, represent­
ing the overall effect of latency within the distributed 
system. For example, latency is increased by periodic 
broadcasts of information or by the inherent delays 
within network hardware and software. The latency is 
a fundamental cause of uncertainty. 
Consider a probability Pk(t). We define an aged view 
of this probability as P"k == Pk(t-T) where Pk(t) = P�o(O) 
for t < 0. Agent k knows with certainty the probabil­
ity of its low and high strategies, Pk and Pk+2• respec­
tively, and has an aged view of the other two probabil­
ities. From the subcomponents point of view, let pk 
be player k's view of the state vector, that is, p1 = 
P3 = (p1,p2,Pa,p4) and P2 = P4 == (pf,p2,pJ,p4)· 
In terms of the rules of the game, the preceding implies 
that a local module, or score keeper, provides a unit 
gain or loss based on the decisions of the local agent 
and the aged probabilities of the distant agent. For ex­
ample, the local module for agent 1 determines the out­
come based on the agent's pure strategy i and chance, 
but where chance is now determined by P2 dil + fi2 di2 
(and the average game element dij is also based on 
aged information). 
Now, (5) may be applied using W�o(Pk) instead of 
the instantaneous vector p. For example, the rate of 
change in Pt ( t) is a function of p1 ( t), p3 (t ), P2 (t-T ), and 
P4(t-T). Formally, (5) is a nonlinear delay differential 
equation (Wiener and Hale, 1992]. 
4 Experiments 
Three games, see Figure 2, are considered with respect 
to learning behavior and the stabiHty of the proba­
bilistic strategies. The games are chosen to facilitate 
the illustration of key points and do not necessarily 
represent an underlying application. In game 1, the 
high level choice is between two game matrices, both 
with pure strategy equilibria of identical payoffs to 
both players. However, an opposite set of actions is 
required to achieve equilibrium. In game 2, the matri­
ces are complements of each other and both are zero­
sum game matrices with mixed strategy equilibria (the 
single game is from [Lakshmivarahan and Narendra, 
1982]). In game 3, one choice is a nonzero-sum game 
matrix with mixed strategy equilibrium and the other 
is the same default game matrix of game 2. 
0.8 
.£ 
:iS 
0.6 
2 c .... 0.4 c..  
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 0.2 0.4 
group strategy 
0.6 0.8 1.0 
Probability 
Figure 3: Phase-Plane Portrait of Game 1 with Two 
Pure Strategy Equilbria (7 = 0) 
Figure 3 shows the action and group strategies for 
game 1 in two experiments with different initialization 
(the delay in the system is zero.) The action strategies 
are plotted as p2 versus p1 and the group strategies as 
P4 versus PJ· The initialization determines which of 
the two pure equilibria is "closest". The single runs 
roughly approximate the predicted behavior based on 
a numerical solution to ( 5 ), that is, the players are able 
to reach an equilibrium in both levels. Note that the 
group strategy for the non-coalition equilibrium does 
not terminate at the origin. Instead, both strategies 
decrease at the same linear rate and whichever strat­
egy reaches zero first (based on initialization) prevents 
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Figure 5: Oscillations in Action Strategies for Game 2 
coalition formation (i.e. c=p3p4=0). This linear be­
havior is due to the contrived nature of the game pay­
offs. 
Figure 3 also shows that a large region of initialization 
is expected to result in the non-coalition equilibrium. 
For example, initialization p3=p4 =0. 7 is in the upper­
right corner but is actually slightly biased to the non­
coalition equilibrium (c=p3p4=0.49). 
Figure 4 shows that players (theoretically) are able to 
reach mixed strategy equilibria (in both the group and 
action levels) for games 2 and 3 without delays. (Un­
less otherwise stated, a=0.02,,8=0.4,0=0.01 for game 2 
and a=0.01,,8=0.05,0=0.1 for game 3). A distinction 
between the two games is that the likelihood of group 
formation, as defined by the clustering parameter c, 
decreases in game 2 and increases in game 3. We now 
consider the effects of delays in the information ex­
changed in these two games. 
Figure 5 shows both a single simulation run and the 
prediction of (5) for game 2. In experiments with insta­
bilities, it is not typically possible to combine multiple 
runs [Kephart et al., 1989]. Each particular run may 
grossly approximate theory, for example, by displaying 
persistent oscillations of appropriate amplitude and 
frequency. However, there are small phase shifts in the 
oscillations among multiple runs that lead to eventual 
obliteration of the oscillations after a long time. In­
stead, correlation must be attempted within each run 
and then averaged over multiple runs. We do not at­
tempt to prove the correlation here but concentrate on 
the predictions of the theory. Independent of the ac­
curacy of the dynamical equation with respect to the 
learning automata experiment, we consider the equa­
tion to be a paradigm for incremental learning. 
We note that the accuracy is affected by the learn­
ing rate 0: the smaller the learning rate, the better 
the accuracy. Large step sizes allow the strategies to 
overshoot the maxima and minima predicted. In Fig­
ure 5(a), the amplitudes in the simulation are larger 
than predicted but would be reduced if a smaller pa­
rameter value was chosen. In both cases, the relative 
delay is the same, i.e. 07 = 15, although the individ­
ual parameters in the two cases differ by an order of 
magnitude. For this reason, we may examine the the­
ory with any value of 0, though we know that a small 
0 must be chosen to get an accurate simulation. Note 
that persistent oscillations are predicted (for the action 
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Figure 7: Phase-Plane Portraits of Action Strategies for Game 2 Near Stability Boundary 
strategies) and we can say that the delay to initiate 
such oscillations, r2, must be less than or equal to 150 
(for 9=0.1). At lower values of delay, the theoretical 
strategies exhibit damped oscillations, however, simu­
lations do not typically show the theoretical damping 
but rather noise in the strategies. 
Figure 5 shows that the players reach a rough equilib­
rium in the group strategies for game 2 but Figure 6, 
for game 3, shows that the group strategies oscillate 
persistently. In this case, we can say that r2 < = 200 
for 9 = 1.0. (Other experiments with this game sug­
gest that both the action and group strategies initiate 
oscillatory behavior at the same delay.) There is a 
rough approximation between theory and simulation, 
again with slightly higher amplitudes in simulation due 
to the step size parameter. 
Figure 7 shows the predicted behavior of the action 
strategies for game 2 for two delays near the stabil­
ity boundary between damped and persistent oscilla­
tions. The damped oscillations reach an equilibrium 
such that the center of the spiral vanishes and the same 
equilibrium serves as an attractor in the persistent os­
cillation case (i.e. limit cycle). Note that the circular 
nature of the phase-plane portrait in Figure 7(b) is an 
alternative display of the persistent oscillations, shown 
over time, in Figure 6(b). From Figure 7(a) and (b), 
we can conclude that 100 < r2 .:::,:: 150. 
Figure 8 shows the onset of a chaotic attractor, with 
corresponding shifting behaviors, at very high delay. 
As noted in Section 3, there is a complex interaction 
between the two levels of learning: action strategies af­
fect group strategies and vice versa. The high delay in 
the experiment induces the strategies to revisit a vari­
ety of potential equilibria, but with small shifts in the 
trajectory. Figure 8( a) shows the specific behavior of 
the action strategies and Figure 8(b) shows the behav­
ior of the group strategies. Together, these two figures 
demonstrate, in four-dimensional space, the complex 
dynamics of learning at two levels under the circum­
stance of delayed information. 
5 Analysis 
In this section, an approximation is used to determine 
the amount of delay r2 required to initiate persistent 
oscillations. The technique involves linearizing in the 
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Figure 8: Chaotic Regime for Game 2 at High Delay (r = 1000) 
neighborhood of the equilibrium p* (a common ap­
proach [Kephart et al., 1989; Farmer, 1982]) and the 
assumption that p3 and p4 are constant and equal to 
the equilibrium values in p*, that is, c = c*. This im­
plies that we ignore the partial derivatives with respect 
to these variables. The resultant equations are 
where 
Y = 8ewt(P*) Y = 8ew2(p*). 
1 op; , 2 apr 
(7) 
(8) 
The partial derivatives are straight-forward (see [Lak­
shmivarahan and Narendra, 1982] for a non-delay zero­
sum version). 
Assuming an exponential solution of the form 6p1 ( t) = 
A1e>-t, 6pr(t) = A1e>.(t-T>, etc. yields 
(>.-XI)(>.- X2) = YtY2e-
2h. (9) 
Let >. = r+iw. There are an infinite number of discrete 
solutions and those parameter settings that yield only 
negative real parts are stable (with perhaps damped, 
but not persistent, oscillations). That is, marginal sta­
bility occurs at r = 0. The stability boundary can be 
determined by substituting >. = iw in (9), applying 
Euler's formula, and solving for the real and imagi­
nary parts: 
cos(2wr) 
sin(2wr) 
(X- w2)JY, 
(Xt + X2)wjY, 
respectively, where X = X 1 X2 and Y = Y1 Y2. 
Dividing (11) by (10), 
(10) 
(11) 
(X1 + X2)w tan(2wT) =X= (12) 
X -w2 
and the instability delay, sufficient to initiate persis­
tent oscillations, is: 
T=1"2 =tan-1(x)/2w, (13) 
where the inverse tangent takes its value in the interval 
[0,1l'/2]. 
Adding the squares of (10) and (11), 
u2 + Bu+C = 0, (14) 
where 
u = w2, B = Xf + Xi, C = X2 + Y2, 
hence w = ±fo. The single solution to the quadratic 
equation is 
U= -B + ../B
2- 4C 
2 
(15) 
as the other solution fails to insure a real (the only 
type of solution) for w (note that B > 0). 
We are now in a position to predict the stability 
boundary between damped and persistent oscillations, 
the results are shown in Table 1 with the cases from 
Figures 5 and 6 included. The predicted values Tp are 
based on (13). The observed values T0 are not from 
simulation but from long runs of (5) at incremental 
delay to determine which delay is sufficient to initiate 
persistent oscillations to within a high degree of ac­
curacy. There is close agreement between the values 
and we can draw three simple conclusions: r2 increases 
with increasing a, decreasing j3, and decreasing 9. The 
first two involve the relative strengths of the penalty 
and reward parameters. The adjustment of parame­
ters to avoid instabilities under delayed information 
is exactly opposite the adjustments required to insure 
equilibria close to the optimal value of the game in 
a non-delayed environment. The last case is obvious 
from the fact that er is a measure of the relative delay; 
in fact, the table shows that the delay 1' is doubled as 
the step size () is halved. Finally, the data suggests 
that ignoring the partial derivatives with respect to 
p3 and p4 did not hinder the analytic prediction (even 
though these probabilities oscillated in game 3). 
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Table 1: Instability Delay: Predicted ( Tp) versus Ob-
served (70) 
game Q /3 (J c• To Tp 
2 0.02 0.80 0.1 0.2374 33 34 
2 0.02 0.40 0.1 0.2417 145 148 
3 O.Dl 0.10 1.0 0.6564 18 22 
3 0.02 0.10 1.0 0.4812 52 51 
3 0.01 0.05 1.0 0.4806 106 102 
3 0.01 0.05 0.5 0.4793 218 203 
6 Conclusions 
A model has been presented with uncertainty in ac­
tions, group dynamics, payoffs, and state informa­
tion. Learning automata achieve equilibrium in the 
particular cases examined with instantaneous infor­
mation. This means that an agent successfully em­
ploys an automaton at each of the two levels. How­
ever, with delays in the system, the behaviors may ex­
hibit damped or persistent oscillations and the onset 
of chaotic regimes. 
The analysis yields the delay required to initiate per­
sistent oscillations; unfortunately, the parameter set­
tings that decrease the likelihood of instabilities also 
increase the likelihood that a suboptimal equilibrium 
will result. This illustrates the fundamental problem 
of seeking the optimum strategy without being mis­
led by delayed information. However, the analysis is 
useful in that agents which communicate often enough 
to insure T < Tz are guaranteed that persistent oscil­
lations will not develop, thus insuring the stability of 
the system. This can have a strong impact on the per­
formance of the system as stability is usually a prereq­
uisite for good performance. In general, stability also 
is a measure of successful learning. 
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